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Designing Successful Business Strategies for Private Public Partnerships: 




The purpose of this paper is to present an innovative approach for the strategic design of Public 
Private Partnerships (PPP) and Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) based on ontology.  
Design/methodology/approach 
Adopting a historic approach, it introduces a posteriori knowledge, deriving from the scheme’s 
stakeholders at the construction and implementation phase of PPPs. Continuous failures of 
these collaboration schemes and initiatives underline the necessity for a novel project structure. 
The conceptual argument is based both on empirical and epistemological approach. It integrates 
the value added of the ontological theory in the PPP/PFI business strategy.  
Findings 
The research emphasises contemporary design gaps of their current structure and proposes an 
ontological redesign. The proposed redesign produces a conceptually innovative scheme, 
which enhances the value added business strategies and their objectives to the structure of these 
collaborating schemes.    
Practical implications 
The ontological design of this paper is useful for academics and business consultants around 
the world and especially in Europe for the successful growth and development of such dynamic 
collaborations. 
Originality/value 
Enterprise ontology bridges conceptual and structural gaps of strategic objectives, which are 
primarily responsible for the failures of PPP collaboration. 
 
Keywords –PPP/PFI, enterprise ontology, business strategies, business redesign, business 
innovation 
 




Effective and sustainable private PPP/PFI schemes are becoming massively important in an era 
of crisis where high public debts seem to rule the global economic environment. PPP and PFI 




based on a long-term structural agreement. It involves innovative financing scheme, identified 
as PFI that requires, in its basic form, a Design, Build, Finance and Operate (DBFO) system 
(Villani and Phillips, 2017; Fewings and Henjewele 2005). Such schemes provide an important 
comparative advantage for countries under crisis towards the attraction of international 
investment.  PPP projects are internationally present in more than 85 countries (OECD, 2008). 
The PFI is a form of a PPP that was introduced in the early 1990s in the UK, but there is also 
global interest towards investing in such collaboration schemes (Wang et al, 2020; Regan et al, 
2009; Holden, 2009). The most important reasons for the introduction of the PPP/PFI schemes 
into a country’s infrastructural development are four. First, the funding of private investors 
provides relief from government budget constraints (Wang et al, 2020; Eadie et al, 2013). 
Second, the valuable experience necessary for providing knowledge transfer to a project’s 
design (Zhu et al, 2017; Oteng and Adjei, 2012). Third, an innovative expertise towards the 
initiation and development of a novel product or service relative to a country’s infrastructural 
needs (Barlow et al, 2008). Finally, the government’s opportunity to concentrate on services 
with high impact factors rather than other ancillary ones (Dewulf and Garvin, 2020). 
The World Bank also emphasises all of the above reasons including expectations gaps 
between public and private sectors, lack of clear government objectives and complex decision-
making (Steinmetz, 2017; Zhang, 2005). These reasons qualify PPP business practices 
worldwide as significantly different from the traditional strategic alliances and tenders. 
Historically, their main differences are: i) the competitive bidding process (Thomson, 2009); 
ii) an appropriate balance of financial and operational risks between the project’s stakeholders 
(Shaoul et al, 2006);  iii) the private sector expertise and the innovative process (Lonsdale, 
2005);  and iv) the improved public services and facilities (Thomson, 2009). 
Although PPP schemes may appear promising, many of them fail (Jiang et al, 2018; 
Gang and Gang, 2017). Empirical studies underline that besides their worldwide dispersion, a 
series of strategic objectives are incrementally exposed within their augmenting 
implementation due to multiple and diverse factors and uncertainties affecting them 
(Koppenjan, 2005; Zangeneh and McCabe 2020). Therefore, there is a need to bridge this 
research gap with a conceptual approach that supports objective PPP operation and structural 
flexibility necessary to adapt to each country’s legal and business environment (Dewulf and 







1.1 Background of the PPP/PFI Collaboration Problem 
 
Since the first decade (1992-2002) of PPP/PFI implementations structural gaps were clearly 
visible, especially internationally, denoting high costs, low efficiency and unreliability 
(Ameyaw & Chan, 2013). These gaps carried on towards the projects’ second implementation 
decade (2003-2013) indicated that there is still a massive importance in the construction and 
development of such collaboration schemes and initiatives (Effah and Chan, 2013). The 
argument towards the translation of the project concept into reliable project remains a strong 
research requirement for its economic viability, as the process of PPP institutionalisation 
remains undermined.  (Casady et al, 2018; OECD, 2008).  Empiricism that has been drawn 
from their applications concerning infrastructural projects (e.g. hospitals and bridges) 
underlines the absence of diverse CSFs responsible for the projects’ failures.  
A common international practice, at the construction stage, refers to public servants 
often negotiating complex demands and preferences without the necessary business knowledge 
or experience (Wang et al, 2020; Pitman and Holve, 2009). Results of such practices are 
devastating for all stakeholders due to lack of CSFs in the PPP’s value chain of activities 
(Microlinks, 2009). From the one hand lack of CSFs relating to primary activities, lead to 
servicing problems, high customer volumes and customer diverse demands as well as servicing 
patterns (Zhu et al, 2017). From the other hand lack of CSFs relating to secondary activities 
include the unbundling of infrastructural and project management posing threats to supporting 
services (e.g. cleaning, energy and security services). As these services fall between the 
project’s scope of management (e.g. for a hospital they relate to clinical management) and 
infrastructural management may pose a threat to the project’s efficiency. According to 
Zangeneh and McCabe (2020), ontology for project knowledge representation facilitates data 
collection, processing, and utilisation for megaprojects.  
Simultaneously, different patterns of managerial decision-making, most of the times 
from different stakeholders (e.g. clinical and infrastructural management), is used for 
optimising mutual strategic PPP concepts and principles in effect. These missing CSFs usually 
generate: i) conflict of interest and lack of transparency (Villani, 2017; Gupta, 2002); ii) lack 
of synergies and communication (Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2000); iii) business operative 
inefficiencies of the stakeholders (Omobowale, 2010); iv) poor business operation structure of 
the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV); and v) managerial monitoring gaps among stakeholders 




Throughout the years, PPP problematic implementation is evident due to the underscoring 
results achieved, where selected case studies investigated the Value for Money (VFM) Critical 
Success Factors (CSFs).  Cui et al. (2018) analysed the existing practices to explore the status 
quo, trends, and research gaps for PPP infrastructure projects to reduce arbitrariness and 
subjectivity in this field. Results vary according to the industry and country (KPMG, 2010). 
Historically, one of the main issues is the problematic conceptualisation of the CSFs Value 
Added (VA) parameter that derives from the scheme’s design (Jingfeng et al, 2009).  
A similar study of Villani, et al. (2017) analyses the PPP structure focusing on the 
organisational mechanisms and processes that are implemented in project’s governance. 
Specifically, the project’s assets and organisational processes. It suggests the development of 
a value added model, which enhances the business effectiveness by bridging cultural gaps 
among different stakeholders. Gang and Gang (2017) supplement Villiani et al. (2017) by 
rethinking the PPP with an unbundling approach. They consider that PPPs are high on risks 
and uncertainties. Therefore, it is necessary to progress with short-term flexible, modular and 
simple arrangements towards an effective management, instead of long-term, rigid and 
complex objectives. A similar study examines the knowledge gaps in PPPs’ infrastructural 
processes, and suggests the adoption of knowledge management tools for managerial practices 
(Boyer, 2016). Accordingly, the application of the KPIs and other financial and accounting 
processes (e.g. budgeting and costing) was found problematic (Chou, Vassar, & Lin, 2008). 
KPIs problematic implementation is also augmented due to strong governmental regulatory 
control mechanisms applied over their private partners with respect to “safety net” qualitative 
processes and budget approvals (Chen et al, 2017; Eadie, 2013).   
  Concluding, PPP/PFIs are not conceiving or linking potential CSFs towards 
efficient design and effective implementation of operational activities. Specifically, they lack 
business objectives’ prioritisation towards primary and secondary processes relating to VfM 
service. Thus, KPIs lack minimum threshold levels of: i) VfM services; ii) consumer oriented 
criteria; and iii) efficient planning and allocation of resources. As a result, the historical data 
of PPP/PFI remains internationally problematic. The aforementioned studies’ results underline 
the importance of design conceptualisation and communication patterns, as they are very 
important for the schemes’ success. It is also important that both public and private partners 
should clearly comprehend the various business contractual mechanisms and objectives, as 






1.2 The Role of Enterprise Ontology in a PPP  
 
It is evident that lack of essential design conceptualisation based on current methodologies 
creates strategic business gaps, relating to project’s objectives, CSFs and KPIs. The scheme’s 
design fails to address its promising potential indicating an undecided future of such 
collaborations. According to Steinmetz, et al. (2017) the use of ontologies optimises the 
information flow and conceptualisation among diverse business domains and sets of 
stakeholders. The role of enterprise ontology is to produce a successful scheme design and 
implementation (Von Rosing & Von Scheel, 2016). Contemporary ontology (Jiang et al, 2018; 
Yolles, 2004), although preserves its original roots, where an “on” according to the Greek 
philosopher Aristotle is something that exists. It also has a very practical and finite role. It 
assists in developing a common understanding in a business design comprehension among 
stakeholders with different sociocultural and scientific background.   
Based on the background of the problem, the main objectives of the ontological redesign is to 
present a novel business design for such collaboration schemes,  to have a flexible sociocultural 
design for an international environment adaption and also to present an objective evaluation 
framework that produces measurable PPP/PFI contract linked results. Enterprise ontology and 
its related methodology (Dietz 2010), engages to a holistic business structural approach. It 
produces a conceptual framework of actors, due to: i) formal and explicit specification of an 
objective conceptualisation; ii) potential for sharing and communicating such 
conceptualisation among stakeholders; iii) transparent and objective system design; and iv) 
potential for an interoperable and expandable formal structure with apparent processes. 
Enterprise ontology and its functionalistic nature dichotomises between the project’s 
business parameters defining them as subjects and objects. From a constructivism’s approach, 
adapted in this study, a novel scheme of a PPP project should focus on the design interpretation 
among the project’s stakeholders. It should eliminate ambiguous understandings entailed in the 
different phases of PPP creation. Ambiguous overlapping and subjective interpretations are, 
among other reasons, mainly responsible for the PPP failures.   
Historically, failures derive from lack of clear processes that generates confusion due to 
different and occasionally overlapping readings and anticipated expectations (Thompson, 
1993). Such schemes in order to capture business oriented semantic gaps should link the 
process of designing and construction with a formal, explicit and common understanding 




that would potentially capture successfully a business oriented sociocultural consensus among 
the scheme’s stakeholders. 
 
 
2. The PPP/PFI Ontological Redesign  
 
The redesign methodology development proposed has its roots to Business Process 
Reengineering (BPR) (Raoa, 2012) and enterprise ontology. The methodology is the Designing 
and Engineering Methodology for Organisations (DEMO) (Dietz, 2006). The redesigned 
scheme will embrace three distinct systems: social, conceptual and technical. The social system 
will provide a clear business essence of the scheme’s strategic objectives and the conceptual 
system will provide the required level of information necessary (Ren et al, 2019), based on 
CSFs, for KPIs implementation. The technical system will introduce the minimum technical 
infrastructure of business intelligence to support the social and conceptual system.  
DEMO will assist in understanding the interrelationships among these three systems 
(social, conceptual, technical) and their actors towards the successful implementation of such 
complex collaboration schemes. These three systems embedded in enterprise ontology will 
comply with the PPP/PFI redesign process. The redesign process is exhibited in figure 1.  
 
2.1 The PPP/PFI Redesign Process 
 
The redesign process presented is defined as the holistic process of a series of steps necessary 
to capture the business knowledge, from an ontological perspective, relating to development 
and implementation of the collaboration scheme (Chen et al, 2017). All systems (social, 
conceptual, technical) forming this collaboration scheme will be defined as systems once they 
comply with four sets of properties. First, it is the composition. The set of actors and elements 
participating in each system category. Second, it is the business environment. The set of actors 
and elements included in the internal business environment (system Kernel) of the PPP/PFI 
framework and the elements included in the external business environment of the PPP/PFI 
framework as well as their interaction. Third, is the production of the actors and other elements 
in the composition that produce the PPP/PFI collaboration contract. Finally, it is the structure. 
It influences and ties among different system actors and their elements within the PPP/PFI 




These ontological properties would determine the CSFs of the internal and external structural 
requirements governing the scheme’s business strategy. The PPP/PFI redesign process is 




Insert here Figure 1 
 
According to Aristotelian teleology and its relating ontological axioms, scheme’s requirements 
decomposition (see figure 1: step 1) will produce in a direct and finite way the interactions 
between the scheme’s systems, actors and environment, based on specific requirements that 
will be designed (see figure 1: step 2 &3). The ontology of the scheme’s internal and external 
environment will conceptualise and synthesise the intrinsic and extrinsic system values of the 
Using System (US) actors according to contemporary business approaches (see figure 1: step 
3 &4). Therefore, these axioms will form the scheme’s structure with the contemporary 
business approaches and ethics (see figure 1: step 5) as governed by “Telos” (the end) (Nagel, 
2012). The above ontological properties will be axiomatically analysed in the next section (2.2) 
following the PPP/PFI Redesign Process (see figure 1).  
 
 
2.2 The Ontological Analysis of the Scheme’s Redesign Process 
 
Analysis initiates by decomposing the internal and external business environment of US 
stakeholders’ roles (see figure 1: step 1). The redesign will introduce four ontological axioms 
that will be used to analyse the scheme’s structure relating to: environmental parameters (e.g. 
internal and external business environment, actor’s decision-making, system’s composition, 
structure); systems (e.g. social, conceptual, and technical) and actors (scheme’s stakeholders, 
e.g. government, banks, consumers). 
The first of the four axioms is the operation axiom where system actors (subjects) act 
with the responsibility for coordination (coordination acts diagrammatically indicated in 
figures 1 and 2) and their definitions that are required for the PPP scheme’s redesign. In 
coordination and production acts the square indicates that the actors are acting based on their 
role and according to their span of authority. The embedded circle in coordination acts indicates 
their responsibility for coordination. In production acts actors produce their service. The 




SMART based result (Yemm, 2013). The PPP strategic goals and objectives will be referred 
as system facts once they are accomplished. 
The second axiom is the transaction axiom where system actors (subjects) perform 
transactions based on their relative stake towards the design and implementation of the 
collaboration scheme. Thus, actors coordinate, based on the first axiom (Performance in Social 
Interaction axiom, or PSI axiom), ordering (e.g. stakeholder 1) for a service (e.g. the formation 
of a PPP). Other actors execute (e.g. stakeholder 3 or 6) the ordered service resulting to a 
production act (e.g. the PPP contract).  
The third axiom is the composition axiom that analyses the quality of the contract 
components (e.g. necessary annexes and other documents attached to the contract). It forms the 
successful transaction resulting to a PPP contract that is now considered a system fact. This 
fact is now present among system actors and produces stakeholder 2 (Special Purpose Vehicle, 
or SPV). 
 The last axiom is the distinction axiom, which clearly distinct the stakeholders’ role 
based on the PPP scheme. Each role is produced based on actor’s ability to communicate as a 
performer and thus taking decisions, or as an informer by expressing expertise, or as a former 
by perceiving documentation. 
Comprehending the US design and the stakeholders’ composition and distinct roles is 
an important step for the selected redesign methodology (see figure 1). Based on the ontological 
axioms, the US will be analysed and strategically assign, based on Language Action Principles 
(LAP) (Habermas, 1981), the stakeholders’ distinct roles and operations (see figure 1, step 1). 
Based on this step (figure 1, step 1) the US implementation abstracts from the ontological level 
of PPP understanding which will be gradually introduced, once missing requirements based on 
CSFs of the US (figure 1, step 2)  are identified at the  Object System (OS) initiation (figure 1, 
step 3).  Further conceptualisation and synthesis of the OS will lead the system redesign (figure 
1, step 4 &5) until its final construction and implementation based on KPIs (figure 1, step 5). 
The proposed redesigned methodology, which is initiated at step one, will distinctively 
decompose the US knowledge. It will be based on the ontological axiom of distinction, which 
is necessary for the comprehension of the actors’ decision-making process of the US. 
 
Step 1: PPP Using System (US) Decomposition based on Ontology  
 
The proposed redesigning starts with the ontological decomposition and analysis of the current 




designates their business strategy (see figure 2). The main objective at this step is the US 
composition according to the distinction axiom and PSI theory of enterprise ontology (Dietz, 
2006). The US composition of actors and their role to the scheme is based on seven 
stakeholders. Stakeholder 1 is the government which most of the times holds the assets of the 
project. It provides the long-term use of the assets (e.g. 25-35 years) through the collaboration 
contract. Stakeholder 2 is the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). The SPV is the system’s kernel. 
It is a legal entity created primarily for the purpose of the project’s management and operation 
and its life span coincides with the one of the project.  It is responsible depending from the 
PPP/PFI scheme for the Design, Building and Financing (DBF) or for the Design Building and 
Operation (DBO) of the services delivery to the governmental stakeholder, ensuring the 
project’s contractual strategy. Usually, the SPV uses public infrastructure until the project ends. 
Stakeholder 3 are the project experts. They are usually services oriented and receive contract 
for delivering the knowledge into the project’s management and operation. Stakeholder 4 is the 
project’s shareholders. Most of the times are legal entities, which provided equity to the project. 
Stakeholder 5 are the consumers of the project (public or private). Stakeholder 6 is the escrow 
agent. The agent is usually responsible for the property and coordinates the examination of all 
legal and economical documentation relating to the income and expenses of the project. 
Stakeholder 7 are the banks. Most of the times they provide capital through long-term debt 
agreements. 
In the US design all project actors, based on distinction axiom, are forming three major 
strategic categories according to their operation roles. The first category includes the internal 
environment’s communication of the actors. The second category includes the external 
environment’s communication of the actors. The third category is the product of their 
communications (internal and external). It expresses the social world and its related 
documentation interaction that will form the strategy of the SPV, giving birth to the project’s 
US design. The US actors’ communication roles are conceptualised based on their competence 
and responsibility. They are dichotomised as objective or subjective and they operationally 
interface with the scheme’s kernel. The kernel will lead their acts which if successfully turned 
in to facts then the strategic objectives of the SPV could be formed.  
One category of actors, coloured in green, includes private or public entities, which have their 
own distinct role in the scheme. They are coordinating with informing transactions producing 
the US structural design. Their role, which is not directly influenced by the system’s kernel 




scheme’s formal structure. Moreover, this category of external actors with primarily objective 
roles is now coloured in green (see figure 2). This category includes stakeholders 6, 7 and 5. 
Stakeholder 6 is the escrow agency. The agency’s communication role is considered objective 
as it coordinates information relating to the legal and economical documentation produced. 
This project actor is an external one as it preserves its own district role with or without the SPV 
formation. 
Stakeholder 7 are the banks. They have an objective communication role performing 
financing transactions for the economic viability of the scheme. They also have their own 
district role regardless of the SPV formation. Stakeholder 5 are the consumers. They are, 
besides their importance, also considered external. Their role is irrelevant to the potential 
implementation requirements of the PPP scheme. It is assumed that these requirements are 
objectively communicated and comprehended from their democratically elected government 
actor.  
Another category is the performa one, coloured in red, where all internal actors are 
included. The actors included have a direct interest to the SPV formation. They will have a 
unique role in the scheme’s composition, which will depend from the business strategy 
governing the US collaboration. This strategy is expressed primarily through written 
documentation (e.g. tariff payments, KH) and is directly relevant to the US scheme’s contract. 
They have their own distinct role in the model structure, which is a priori subjective due to the 
unique SPV formation of each PPP/PFI scheme (Liu and Wilkinson, 2014).  Thus, the 
fundamental challenge of a successful and objective decision-making is led by the individual 
strategic perceptions of these internal actors. They will expose commitment (e.g. shareholders) 
or evoke commitment (e.g. government) leading the formation of the SPV. These actors are 1, 
3 and 4. 
Stakeholder 1 is the government. The government’s communication role is considered 
subjective. It represents its political agenda based on which it conceptualises these 
collaboration schemes. It aims to secure its role towards the legal and economical 
documentation produced (e.g. risk transfer). Its responsibility includes a contract production. 
This project actor perceived as an internal one. It preserves its own district role, based on its 
fundamental production act that of the contract.  
Stakeholder 3 are the project experts. The expert’s communication role is also considered 
subjective.  Their role’s activity, as denoted in figure 2, is an executional one and thus it should 
be evaluated accordingly. They have to produce a KH service for the project.  The performance 




Know-How (KH) services transferred from previous empirical evidence. Thus, the unique 
dynamics behind the changing governmental strategy of social, economic and political 
environment define largely the methodology adopted by experts and not vice versa. Once the 
scheme’s KH learning process is adapted, it will be used to prioritise the strategic regeneration 
of the US. Then strategic alliances will stop lacking alliance strategies (Trafford and Proctor, 
2006). Thus, the role of this actor is subjective and finite. 
 Stakeholder 4 are the shareholders. The shareholder’s communication role is also 
subjective depending from the contractual interrelation of each actor. Internal actors aim to 
secure the projects viability position towards the legal and economical documentation produced 
(e.g. risk transfer and KH). This actor is an internal one, within the SPV kernel. It preserves its 
own distinct role upon the implementation of the SPV. This category of internal players like 
the government, project experts and shareholders is coloured in red (see figure 2).  
The last category, coloured in blue, contains the necessary PPP information documents 
leading the strategic alliances among the US external and internal environment actors (see 
figure 2).   It is an essential category as it could analyse the intrinsic and extrinsic actor values 
(e.g. financial, marketing, innovation and learning issues analysed in the contract validities) of 
a successful PPP design. These documents are also uttering strategic information in writing 
(e.g. contracts) to be stored and evaluated SMART.   
 
 
Insert here Figure 2 
 
 
This initial step presents the current situation (US) of the actors participating in the US design 
according to enterprise ontological properties and distinction axiom. Thus, their social 
interaction and their related environments (external or internal) could now be ontologically 
conceptualised based on their roles (subjective or objective) and their relating performance 
(based on intrinsic or extrinsic or intrinsic values). The dichotomy implemented, at this step, 
between subjects and objects and their business interaction will assist to the following 
methodology steps towards an objective PPP redesign. Step 2 (see figure 1) will determine the 
missing US requirements relating them to performance of intrinsic and extrinsic stakeholder’s 
values aiming towards a novel conceptualisation at step 3.  
 




In step 2, the determination of the US missing requirements is in order. At this step, focus is 
placed on the missing system requirements according to enterprise ontology.  In the US many 
problems arise due to lack of system’s specification parameters. The presence of such 
requirements should be emphasised from the first phase of the project, the bid phase. At his 
phase, evaluation criteria, methodology and measurability for assessing future KPIs should be 
objectively designed (Lam et al., 2010).  Objectivity is a missing parameter to many 
contemporary PPP projects resulting to poor operational design and implementation (Xu et al, 
2020). Thus the fundamental value of the PPP/PFI contract, which the sum of its intrinsic and 
extrinsic values, requires an objective strategic conceptualisation (methodology step 3). 
According to the problem’s historic background there are many cases, especially on the 
NHS (Mayston, 1999), where hospital PPP/PFI schemes show VfM only after risk-transfer. 
According to this innovative ontological approach, all stakeholders should be engaged to the 
design process. This phase should determine the missing requirements for a successful strategy 
(e.g. CSFs) taking into consideration objective and subjective perceptions of all environmental 
factors analysed at methodology step1. 
Aligning their performa, informa and forma knowledge activities relates the PPP/PFI 
contract risk (extrinsic contract value) with the VfM (intrinsic contract risk). Therefore, the 
scheme performs KPIs once the intrinsic value of the contract (VfM) is aligned with its 
extrinsic value. As a result, it underlies the necessity of bridging the conceptual gaps. 
According to literature review, conceptual gaps are the missing requirements among VfM, 
CSFs and KPIs and they should be visualised to the novel redesign.  According to Osei-Kyei 
et al. (2017), upgraded consultation and design visualisation would improve the problem of 
poor design. Although, this conceptual gap of opaque visualisation is not a new one. According 
to figure 2,  this type of risk is persisting in the US design. It is discovered between the SPV 
and the escrow agent. It is an important gap as the result of the contracting process more than 
triples the cost of capital. Specifically, it raises it from 8% to 27%, as a percentage of trust’s 
annual operating income managed by the escrow agent (Pollock et al, 2002). Following that 
US conceptual gap, banks (Stakeholder 7) through bank payments are profiting more from the 
scheme and local government stakeholders are struggling to survive. These external and 
internal actors’ empirical cases will determine the missing requirements of the US. In addition, 
the redesign of an OS should carefully consider these conceptualisation gaps and synthesise 
the collaboration scheme’s concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic values. 
Evidence shows that project experts (stakeholder 3) are closely monitoring this process. They 




achievable outcome based on KPIs. Maximum achievable outcome is defined as the best VfM 
service (Zhang, 2005). Problems initiate from the initiation phase due to subjective definition 
of the project’s strategic objectives and their poor evaluation schemes (Zhang, 2005). Thus, the 
interrelation and communication of all the project’s stakeholders is becoming difficult due to 
the conceptual gaps and expected facts occurring among the different types of stakeholders’ 
knowledge activities. The conceptual gaps emerge discrepancies in the US design requirements 
and their relating actor’s interactions, which are composed of: i) quality costs (intrinsic value 
linking to KPIs and VfM); ii) time frames (intrinsic value linking to KPIs and VfM); iii) 
coordination acts (extrinsic value linking to CSFs and risk); and iv) communication services 
(extrinsic value linking to CSFs and risk).   
These discrepancies jeopardise the strategies designed for the project’s value added and 
the performance level achieved (Jingfeng et al, 2009).  The discrepancies of the strategic 
objectives relate to contract’s intrinsic and extrinsic values the US KPIs are failing to capture 
VfM services thresholds relating to CSFs (e.g. budgets constraints, risks and revenues) 
(Larhsoukanh & Wang, 2019). Divergent conception of the collaboration scheme and its 
strategic objectives from stakeholders initiates strategic conflicts (De Schepper et al, 2014). 
The ultimate recipients of these conflicts are the consumers (stakeholder 5) as they are not 
receiving a VfM service.  
Concluding, the above missing requirements are identified at this step for OS redesign and 
ontological conceptualization. They are the extrinsic and intrinsic contract values and their 
relation to CSFs, which link to VFM services and their relating KPIs. The next step is the OS 
system function and conceptualisation, which should take into consideration all the missing 
requirements identified at this step. The OS design should consider KPIs based on a novel PPP 
objective conceptualisation, which takes into account the scheme’s CSFs. It delivers an 
integrated design that formalises all organisational requirements. The novel system’s feasibility 




Step 3. Identify Object System (OS) Function Requirements 
 
 
At this methodology step (see figure 1, step 3) an identification of the OS requirements is 




theorem of DEMO provides a holistic  and distinct essence of the US organisational 
conceptualisation  (see figure 2) based on its composition, production and environment 
supporting the overall goal of the PSI and the ontological axioms presented at previous 
methodology steps (figure 1, step1&2) (De Jong and Dietz, 2010). So, before the OS is 
conceptualised (see figure 1, step 4) an identification of the prominent functional requirements 
for the OS based on the US missing requirements is important. Based on dichotomy principle 
introduced (see figure 2 step 1) the actors according to their roles (objective or subjective) are 
performing acts (performa, informa and forma) in order to meet the contract strategy and 
values. According to this axiom the schemes stakeholders possess three distinct human abilities 
critical to the system’s design specification as they lead to various operative actions. The 
performa ability exposes a commitment leading to business decisions (ontological action), the 
informa ability formulates a thought leading to reasoning (infological action) and the forma 
ability that perceives information leading to storing actions (forma action). Based on this 




Insert here Figure 3 
 
 
The main goal at this step is to describe and conceptualise the PPP scheme according to the 
distinction axiom and compare it with the current communication scheme. The designing tool 
of ontological parallelogram denotes the PPP conceptualisation (see figure 4). In this 
conceptual framework, the objective sign of a successful collaboration strategy is adopted for 
representing the scheme.  This successful sign designates the concept that is a subjective 
individual mental picture of the aim.  It simultaneously denotes its objective properties, which 
are stated by selected CSFs.  The type of PPP/PFI collaboration agreements extends to a class 
of KPIs.  These KPIs could populate selected CSFs.  Thus, the object of CSFs could conform 
to the PPP/PFI agreements. The PPP aim is referenced by the CSFs underlying an objective 
bridging of current conceptual gaps. The ontological parallelogram exhibits how PPP/PFIs 
could be successfully conceptualised to global organisational actors, regardless of their 
sociocultural background. 
 





In conclusion, to complete the conceptualisation of the OS the three major sets of conceptual 
parameters missing at this methodology step are presented.  Firstly is the PPP objectives’ 
implementation, which requires alignment and trust. For years, mistrust and hostility between 
some or all of the partners is present most of the times (Bennett et al, 1998). The 
conceptualisation and its objectives’ design (see figure 4), eliminates generalisations that lack 
specificity. It provides fertile ground for methodological parametrisation, as it eliminates the 
obscurity of multiple and contradicting concepts, which build tension between autonomy and 
accountability (Huxham and Vangen, 2000). DEMO and enterprise ontology are monitoring 
such conceptual gaps, as demonstrated by figure 2 and 4 in an objective manner. According to 
Trafford and Proctor (2006) major parameters that should be included to such an objective 
focused design are: Communication, Openness, Planning, Ethos and Direction (COPED) all of 
which are present to Language Action Principles (LAP) embedded in the enterprise ontology 
(Dietz, 2006). 
The second conceptual parameters missing is the objectives’ performance and control. 
This parameter most of the times possess a major disappointment for PPP evaluation as key 
performance indicators usually are directly related from the parameters presented in the 
previous missing list of requirements described as COPED. Therefore, a framework of five 
KPI-categories in the areas of physical characteristics of the project, financing and marketing 
indicators, innovation and learning, stakeholders’ indicators and process indicators should be 
present to cover potential conceptual gaps (Jingfeng et al, 2009). These indicators should be 
present from the biding until monitoring and controlling processes of the product for both 
public and private stakeholders (Kumaraswamy and Anvuur, 2008). The CSF should be 
carefully selected, based on the conceptual framework (see figure 4), for the performance 
evaluation of the scheme. Performance transparency and objectivity versus subjectivity should 
be considered to a successful controlling process.  
The third conceptual parameters missing is the objectives flexibility. Most unsuccessful 
PPP projects’ objectives are static. They lack adaptability throughout the project’s lifecycle in 
relation to social and economic parameters. Most of the times PPPs initiate under different 
external environmental parameters. Over their long contracting lifecycle, these parameters 
change and stakeholders fail to cope, making the scheme’s objectives obsolete (Abdel, 2007). 
 Consequently, an innovative approach in relation to traditional public or private 
business scheme construction requires a dynamic monitoring and parametrisation of the CSFs 






3. Conclusions and research outlook 
 
This paper methodologically provides a novel, transparent and globally sustainable conceptual 
design. It addresses complex and diverse empirical evidence on PPP/PFI business collaboration 
strategies, which although possess different sociocultural and economic dimensions, they are 
not exclusively distinct. According to enterprise ontology application and its related 
methodology DEMO, this study provides a global, dynamic and objectively supported and 
comprehensive design, addressing the ongoing PPP structural failures.  
The findings of this study address a plethora of general and non-critical arguments with 
respect to the design of PPP/PFIs rooting. These arguments are sourced from: i) the lack of 
actors’ coordination and responsibility resulting into conflicts (Casady et al, 2018; Girth, 2014), 
ii) scepticism with respect to its aim and objectives (Liu and Wilkinson, 2014), and iii) lack of 
commitment and transparent governance (Osei-Kyei et al, 2017). It catalytically therapises its 
design to overcome problematic economic viability arising from lack of trust and reluctance 
for cooperating with incohesive sociocultural practices. Enterprise ontology’s organisational 
theorem and the ontological parallelogram (see figure 4) objectively support the aim of the 
contract agreement, improving heterogeneous multilevel management. As a result, they resolve 
potential conflicts among collaborating actors (Wang et al, 2020; Marques and Cruz, 2013). 
This business organisational design ontologically delivers an increased efficiency over 
measurable quality services, which could be supported from critical successful acts, defined as 
facts. At information and data level, these facts are providing equal information access to all 
decision-makers. The organisational theorem categorises bilateral communication 
stakeholders’ roles and homogeneously spans their managerial control. The ontological 
parallelogram designates successful strategies based on a transparent design that objectively 
conceptualises the value added aim and objectives.  
Furthermore, international accounting processes (e.g. costing and budgeting) could 
measure critical successful facts, which objectively conform to the PFI type as an instantiation 
of the PPP collaboration concept. Accordingly, these ontologically based transactions could 
enable activity-based costing, budgeting and monitoring, facilitating the financial sustainability 
of the project. Cost drivers could be assigned to each LAP-oriented activity, as schematically 
conceived by the ontological parallelogram, enabling novel strategies for improved risk 




services (Regan et al, 2011). According to Jiang et al. (2018), this combination of ontological 
modeling techniques and PPP-based risk analysis methods efficiently deals with the 
complexity in organisational storage and re-use of risk information. 
  The scheme’s ontological operation facilitates project’s economic evaluation activities 
with the adoption of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), creating necessary 
lifecycle costing at all phases of the project (Brown et al, 2017). Thus, the findings of this study 
reveal a consistent design providing fertile ground for future research on PPP models in terms 
of methodology and successful design conceptualisation. It eliminates trivial results, arising 
from literature generalities. It also epistemologically unfolds the strategic comparative 
advantage and value added of successful PPP/PFIs concepts.  Therefore, on the one hand, this 
ontological approach leads to an innovative global view of the international principles 
regarding successful PPP/PFI schemes. On the other hand, there are certain design limitations 
relating to: i) kernel’s analysis and evaluation; ii) unanimity on the scheme’s strategic 
objectives; and iii) conceptual framework application and activity control. 
 A successfully designed PPP/PFI could attract local and international investment 
partnerships, as it conceives innovative and technological activities due to its semantic 
objectivity (Kamsu-Foguem et al, 2019). It also critically improves the sociocultural 
infrastructure and provides a mutually inclusive and holistic partnership. This study also 
contributes to the engineering of successful PPPs by demonstrating how its holistic 
conceptualisation is hierarchically disseminating among collaborating actors. A successfully 
designed PPP/PFI could also address core problematic issues regarding informational 
democracy for equal access to decision-making between public and private actors, qualifying 
for highly impactful global involvement partnerships. 
Finally, this study could motivate a further systematic examination of ontologically 
empowered activity functions in the collaborating policies, processes and transactions. Further 
analysis could reveal the potential impact of the proposed design on the long-term viability of 
PPP/PFIs. This framework could be also considered as an international toolbox for OECD 
policy makers, upgrading the social profile of PPP/PFIs by actively engaging consumers to 
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